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By Deputy Clark

### MONTANA FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT LEWIS AND CLARK COUNTY

RIKKI HELD, et al.,

Plaintiff,

V.

STATE OF MONTANA, et al.,

Defendant.

Cause No. CDV-2020-307

ORDER ON MOTION UNDER RULE 35(a) FOR INDEPENDENT MEDICAL EXAMINATIONS

Defendants State of Montana, et al. (State) have moved under Montana Rule of Civil Procedure 35(a) for Independent Medical Examinations (IMEs) of eight of the named Plaintiffs in this case. The State argues that Plaintiffs have placed their mental health in controversy, and that the State has good cause for requesting the IMEs. Plaintiffs oppose the motion, both parties have submitted briefs, and the matter is ready for decision.

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#### BACKGROUND

The background pertinent to this motion follows:

In their complaint challenging the constitutionality of the State Energy Policy and Climate Change Exception to the Montana Environmental Policy Act, Plaintiffs allege, among other injuries, types of emotional distress such as anxiety and despair, caused by climate change, environmental degradation, and government action/inaction they argue is making climate change worse. Plaintiffs have also submitted an expert disclosure and report from Dr. Lise Van Susteren, M.D., a psychiatrist who has studied the relationship between climate change and mental health. Van Susteren's report sets forth her qualifications, lays out the academic basis for the relationship between climate change, government action/inaction, and mental health, describes her methodology for interviewing five of the Plaintiffs, and includes profiles of each of the five she interviewed. The State argues it is "entitled to test whether the two laws Plaintiffs challenge have caused their allegedly severe psychological injuries, or whether other causes are responsible," and demands IMEs not only for the five Plaintiffs interviewed by Van Susteren, but for three additional Plaintiffs as well. Defs.' Reply Supp. Mot. For IMEs at 7.

#### LEGAL STANDARD

Unlike other rules of discovery, Rule 35 has "a high standard" that must be met before a court may order an IME. *Lewis v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct.*, 2012 MT 200, ¶ 7, 366 Mont. 217, 286 P.3d 577. Montana courts apply the following test before ordering an IME: 1) a party's mental or physical condition /////

must really and genuinely be in controversy, and 2) the movant must show good cause. *Id.*, ¶ 6; *In re Marriage of Binsfield*, 269 Mont. 336, 341, 888 P.2d 889 (1995). See also, *Schlagenhauf v. Holder*, 379 U.S. 104, 118 (1964).

IMEs are "an extraordinary form of discovery," "the most intrusive and, therefore, the most limited discovery tool," and "must be balanced against Plaintiffs' constitutional right to privacy under Montana Constitution Article II, Section 10." State ex rel. Mapes v. Dist. Ct. of the Eighth Jud. Dist., 250 Mont. 524, 529, 532, 822 P.2d 91 (1991); Simms v. Mont. Eighteenth Jud. Dist. Ct., 2003 MT 89, ¶ 30, 315 Mont. 135, 68 P.3d 678; Lewis, ¶ 6.

"The language of the rule is discretionary. It authorizes, but does not require, a district court to order a party to submit to a psychological examination" even when the high standard has been met. *Binsfield*, 269 Mont. at 340. "[I]t is well accepted that a party does not possess an absolute right to obtain an independent medical examination."

Simms,  $\P$  28.

#### DISCUSSION

# I. Is Plaintiffs' mental health "really and genuinely in controversy?"

Defendants argue Plaintiffs have made an "unfortunate choice to place their mental health at the center of this case," and that "[t]he issue of standing very well may turn on" the psychological component of Plaintiffs' alleged injuries. Defs.' Br. Supp. Mot. For IMEs at 2; Defs.' Reply Supp. Mot. For IMEs at 4-5. Plaintiffs maintain that the emotional and psychological harms they allege are not part of an independent tort claim or a claim for damages, but merely bolster their standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statutes at issue. Pl.'s Br. Opp. Mot. For IMEs at 2. Plaintiffs argue that the "undisputed"

nature of the constitutional claims and relief at issue do not include damages based on proving (or defending against) emotional injury." Pl.'s Br. Opp. Mot. For IMEs at 13.

In Lewis v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., the Montana Supreme Court cited Turner v. Imperial Stores, 161 F.R.D. 89 (S.D. Cal. 1995), and set forth a list of factors helpful to past courts in determining whether a party's mental health is in controversy. Lewis, ¶ 8. Defendants cite Turner and assert that applying the Turner factors will lead this court to hold that Plaintiffs have put their mental health in controversy. However, in Lewis, the Court quoted Stevenson v. Stanley Bostitch, Inc., 201 F.R.D. 551, 554 (N.D. Ga. 2001), which lists the factors as follows:

The majority of federal courts "recognize that a mental exam is warranted when one or more of the following factors are present: (1) a tort claim is asserted for intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress; (2) an allegation of a specific mental or psychiatric injury or disorder is made; (3) a claim of unusually severe emotional distress is made; (4) plaintiff intends to offer expert testimony in support of [a] claim for emotional distress damages; and/or (5) plaintiff concedes that her mental condition is in controversy within the meaning of Rule 35."

Lewis, ¶ 8.

Applying these factors to the instant case, factors two, three, and four are potentially applicable. Regarding the fourth factor, expert testimony to support a claim for emotional distress damages, Defendants are correct that the original *Turner* list did not include the word "damages". However, that factor has evolved. The *Lewis* court quoted the factors as set forth in *Stevenson*, and, since *Lewis* is binding precedent, this court will use the same language. Van Susteren's testimony is not being offered to support an independent claim for emotional

distress damages, but as part of standing to challenge the constitutionality of statutes. Therefore, Van Susteren's report does not, on its own, bring Plaintiffs' mental health into controversy under factor four.

As to factors two and three, Defendants argue that Van Susteren's use of the terms "pre-traumatic stress disorder," "abuse," and "profound psychological damage" in her report bring the alleged distress into controversy. Defs.' Br. Supp. Mot. For IMEs at 6, 8. However, Plaintiffs have not alleged any diagnoses of specific psychiatric injuries, which are typically present when courts order IMEs. In *Turner* itself, which Defendants repeatedly cite, the United States District Court for the Southern District of California ultimately held:

This court concludes that "emotional distress" is not synonymous with the term "mental injury" as used by the Supreme Court in Schlagenhauf v. Holder for purposes of ordering a mental examination of a party under Rule 35(a), and specifically disagrees with those few cases holding that a claim for damages for emotional distress, without more, is sufficient to put mental condition "in controversy" within the meaning of the Rule. If this were the law, then mental examinations could be ordered whenever a plaintiff claimed emotional distress or mental anguish. Rule 35(a) was not meant to be applied in so broad a fashion.

Turner at 97.

Notably, the plaintiff in *Turner* was seeking more than one million dollars in damages for mental anguish and emotional distress. The *Turner* court still held that her mental health was not in controversy. *Id*.

Even when there is a tort claim for emotional distress or psychological damages, courts are cautious about ordering IMEs. In *Lewis*, the Montana Supreme Court stated, "[w]e have never ruled that a plaintiff's claim for general emotional distress damages is, in and of itself, a sufficient basis for

IMEs?

ordering a Rule 35 mental examination." *Lewis*, ¶ 8. Defendants correctly assert that independent tort claims or emotional distress damages are not required to order an IME, but their absence in this case leads the court to take a cautious approach before ordering "the most intrusive and, therefore, the most limited discovery tool." *Simms*, ¶ 30.

Plaintiffs have not placed their mental health at the center of this case, nor is it really and genuinely in controversy. First, the court disagrees with Defendants' assertion that Plaintiffs' standing "very well may turn" on the issue of psychological harm. Plaintiffs have also alleged economic, physical health, aesthetic, and recreational injuries. The emotional harm issue is not a core issue in the case. Second, the types of mental anguish and emotional distress alleged by Plaintiffs and supported by Van Susteren's testimony are not the specific or unusually severe psychiatric injuries or disorders contemplated in the factors articulated in *Stevenson* and *Lewis*. Van Susteren's report uses novel terminology, which may be grounds for an evidentiary challenge, but not for ordering a swath of IMEs for eight Plaintiffs. Defendants have failed to show that Plaintiffs' mental health is really and genuinely in controversy.

## II. Has the State shown good cause for their requested

"A psychiatric examination is particularly invasive of an individual's right to privacy." *State ex rel. Mapes*, at 532. The Rules of Civil Procedure "should be liberally construed, but they should not be expanded by disregarding plainly expressed limitations." *Schlagenhauf* at 121. "[B]y adding the words '. . . good cause . . .,' the Rules indicate that there must be greater showing of need under Rules 34 and 35 than under the other discovery rules."

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*Id.* at 118. "Obviously, what may be good cause for one type of examination may not be so for another. The ability of the movant to obtain the desired information by other means is also relevant." *Id.* 

Even if Plaintiffs' mental health were in controversy, Defendants have not established good cause for the requested examinations, which they say, "may also include, but is not limited to," probing into Plaintiffs' "psychological and behavioral history, alcohol and drug use, school performance, and exposure to trauma." Defs.' Br. Supp. Mot. For IMEs at 5. The scope is too broad.

To meet the threshold requirement of standing, Plaintiffs alleged economic, physical health, aesthetic, and recreational injuries. Some of their alleged injuries are mental and emotional in nature, including fear, anxiety, and despair caused by climate change and the government action/inaction that is allegedly making it worse. In response, Defendants propose a fishing expedition to find some other cause for that distress. For example, the State cites Plaintiff Rikki Held's feelings of "stress and despair when thinking about how the State of Montana has known about climate disruption for decades." Compl., ¶ 20. Defendants' proposed method of defending against the allegations of mental anguish is to subject Rikki Held to an invasive interrogation about her school performance, past trauma, and psychological history. The State characterizes the proposed IMEs as "ask[ing] the Youth Plaintiffs questions . . . [t]hat's it." Defs.' Reply Supp. Mot. For IMEs at 6 (emphasis in original). What Defendants gloss over is that those questions could be about anything as innocuous as their grades, which are still protected by their right to privacy, all the way to deeply private and upsetting matters as childhood abuse. Allowing this intrusion would be an unnecessary violation of Plaintiffs' right to privacy. Simms, ¶ 32; State ex rel. Mapes at 532.

The State is not, as it asserts, "flying blind." Defs.' Br. Supp. Mot. For IMEs at 9. It was provided Van Susteren's full report, including confidential information, through discovery. Furthermore, as Plaintiffs observe, the State has ample alternatives to mount an informed defense. To start, the State is currently deposing Plaintiffs. The State may also depose and cross-examine Van Susteren. Furthermore, the State may call their own expert to dispute Van Susteren's conclusions and methodology without subjecting Plaintiffs to invasive IMEs. These are just a few of the options available to the State to defend itself on this issue. The State has not met its burden to show good cause for the requested psychological examinations because the scope is too broad, and it has ample alternatives to defend against the claims of mental anguish and emotional distress.

# III. Should this court strike Plaintiffs' allegations of psychological distress and Van Susteren as an expert witness?

As an alternative to the IMEs, the State asks the court to strike all allegations of psychological harm and disallow any opinions or testimony by Van Susteren. Plaintiffs' allegations in the complaint are within the bounds of general emotional distress and the court will not strike them. As to Van Susteren's report, Plaintiffs correctly assert that "Montana law regarding Rule 35 discovery does not control the separate standards that might apply if the State wishes to challenge Dr. Van Susteren's future expert testimony. Those standards—by contrast—fall under the Montana Rules of Evidence." Pl.'s Br. Opp. Mot. For IMEs at 17. Tacking this request on the end of a Rule 35 motion without citing an applicable Rule providing the basis to strike does not properly place the issue before the court.

#### CONCLUSION

The court views the mini trial emerging over the psychological components of Plaintiffs' standing as a distraction. Even if the psychological aspects of Plaintiffs' injuries were excluded, Plaintiffs have standing based on alleged economic, physical health, aesthetic, and recreational injuries. The State has not met its high burden to show Plaintiffs' mental health is really and genuinely in controversy, nor that there is good cause to order IMEs for eight of the Plaintiffs.

The Rule 35(a) motion for IMEs of eight Plaintiffs by Dr. Stratford is **DENIED**.

DATED this 14 day of October, 2022.

KATHY SEELEY

District Court Judge

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